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 Abstract:  Utilizing data from our surveys of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in 
1992-93 and 2003-04, this paper offers an attitudinal portrait of the degree to which European 
elites have successfully navigated the contradictions posed by the increasing securitization of 
immigration after September 11th. We specifically asked to what degree MEPs: view 
immigration as a salient and multi-dimensional security threat; support greater rights for 
immigrants; and prefer an EU over a national policy making venue to regulate immigration 
policy.  Our analysis of the data yielded mixed results. On the one hand, a majority of 
contemporary MEPs concluded that immigration was “very important,” favored increasing 
economic immigration, and rejected the suggestion that immigration poses a cultural threat. On 
the other hand, and contrary to our expectations, MEP support for the extension of immigrant 
rights declined from 1993 to 2004 and, most surprising, MEPs were less inclined in 2004 than in 
1993 to look to Europe in order to resolve immigration-related dilemmas. Although a robust 
majority agreed that a European immigration policy is more urgent after September 11th, it is fair 
to conclude on the basis of the aggregate data that MEPs in 2004, as in 1993, were not especially 
inclined to view immigration through the prism of national or European security. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Among its other important political effects, the association of immigration with terrorism in a 
post-September 11
th security environment has imposed upon West European governments and the 
institutions of the European Union the burden of reconciling the contradictions posed by what 
hitherto had been a stable but relatively fragmented immigration policy equilibrium (Figure 1) .  
This segmented equilibrium has been historically comprised of three discreet and fairly insulated 
dimensions: 1) economic: securing an adequate and appropriate supply of foreign workers for the 
many tight domestic labor markets across Western Europe (Martin et al. 2006: 55-120); 2) social: 
fostering good social relations between native populations and immigrants and facilitating the 
incorporation of the latter into their host societies (Favell 2001); and 3) physical safety: 
safeguarding Europe’s external borders and deterring cross-national crime and terrorism 
(Koslowski 2001; Bigo 2001).  Indeed, the intersection of the aforementioned dimensions within 
public and political elite discourse and their increasing “securitization” since September 11
th raise 
reasonable doubts about whether their previously distinct agendas can be politically reconciled.   
(Figure 1) 
  The central purpose of this article is to assess to the degree to which one group of 
European political elites, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), has successfully 
  1navigated the contradictions posed by the multidimensionality of a security-linked migration 
threat.  In so doing, it considers the implications for public policy of the incremental emergence 
of immigration as a perceived cultural, economic and physical safety threat.  Utilizing data from 
our surveys of Members of the European Parliament in 1992-1993 and 2003-2004, we 
specifically seek to discover to what degree MEPs: 1) view immigration as a salient and multi-
dimensional security threat; 2) support greater economic, political and social rights for 
immigrants; and 3) prefer an EU over a national policy making venue for regulating immigration 
policy.  Finally, we assess the implications of changing attitudes for the emergence of a 
comprehensive common European immigration policy. 
 
Theoretical Overview 
As numerous scholars have astutely observed (Alexseev 2005: 175-176; Bigo 2001; Carrera 
2005; Heisler and Layton Henry 1993; Huysmans 1994; Huysmans 2000a; Levy, 2005: 54; 
Weiner 1995: 87-88), the so-called “securitization of immigration” within contemporary Western 
Europe has been rooted in, and is inextricably linked to, the permanent settlement of large and 
ethnically and culturally distinctive ethnic minority populations within the major immigration-
receiving countries.  Although posing a modest threat to physical safety before and after the so-
called turning point,
1 it is primarily the economic and cultural fears aroused by mass immigrant 
settlement that have proved especially politically potent and universal (Betz 1994: 85; 
Commander et al. 2006; Huysmans 2000b).   
                                                           
1 The “turning point,” or the juncture at which governments initiated aggressive efforts to reduce 
dramatically the influx of foreign labor after WWII, arrived at different moments across the immigration-
receiving countries (Hammar 1985: 7).  In Britain and Switzerland, for instance, the turning point arrived 
relatively early.  In both countries outbreaks of mass xenophobia and the rise of virulent anti-immigrant 
popular sentiment persuaded policy makers to curb labor immigration during the 1960s (Hoffman-Nowotny 
1985: 217; Messina 1989: 34-44).  For the other immigrant-receiving countries within Western Europe, on 
the other hand, the turning point came later and was primarily triggered by the economic slump and mass 
unemployment precipitated by the first oil shock of the early 1970s.   
 
  2Well before September 11, 2001, constructivists presciently captured the rise of ‘new 
security’ threats such as identity, immigration and ethnic conflicts in a global era (Huysmans, 
2000a: 752; Waever, 1998; Buzan et al, 1998; Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993).  On this score, 
Huysmans (2000a: 752) observed that immigration “has been increasingly presented [in public 
political discourse] as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labor market 
stability; it has been securitized.”  Echoing Huysmans, Kicinger (2004: 2-3) cited social stability, 
demographic concerns, risks to cultural identity, increasing levels of crime, and the threat to a 
generous and universal welfare state as the core features of the immigration-security nexus.  To 
be sure, the political aftershocks following the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, 
the Madrid bombings of 2004, and the 2005 London terrorist attacks have accelerated the 
securitization of immigration (Alexseev 2005: 37).  Nevertheless, it was not until the general 
public’s anxieties about “societal security” (Waever 1998)
2 intersected with its fears about 
immigration as a threat to physical safety during the 1990s that the securitization of immigration 
became firmly embedded within the domestic and regional politics of Western Europe.  In Faist’s 
view (2002: 11), immigration was now elevated to the status of a “meta-issue,” an overarching 
concern in which the boundaries of immigration as a threat to “external” and “internal” security 
have become increasingly blurred (Bigo 2001: 121-122; Geddes 2001: 29-30).   
        Whatever its causes, the inclusion of immigration-related issues in a new European 
“security continuum” (Aradau 2001) has had a three-pronged political effect.  First, it has reified 
immigration in the popular mind as a phenomenon that imperils the quality of life in Europe 
(Alexseev 2005: 66-67; Huysmans 2000a: 752; Tsoukla 2005).  As Ederveen et al. (2004: 82) 
have demonstrated, more than half of all respondents in 19 EU countries currently view ethnic 
                                                           
2 According to Waever (1998), societal security is the sustainability, within acceptable limits for evolution, 
of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, custom and religious and national identity within a 
given country.  It advances the view that societies, which include ethno-nationalist groups, religious groups 
and potentially other communities founded on gender, sexuality or class, can be threatened from many 
sources, including immigration which poses the greatest threat.  Immigration threatens the identity of a 
society by causing the composition of society to shift in a manner that may undermine the hegemony of the 
prevailing socio-cultural model (Buzan et al. 1998).  
  3minorities as posing some level of cultural and/or economic threat (see Table 1).  In general, 
citizens within the least affluent member state countries (i.e., Greece, Czech Republic, and 
Hungary) are more inclined to perceive ethnic minorities as threatening than those within the 
most affluent countries.  Among the major immigration-receiving countries, the perception of 
threat is highest in Belgium and the United Kingdom.  
(Table 1) 
  Second, the current immigration-security nexus fuels further public doubts about the 
wisdom of the decision of national governments to permit permanent mass immigrant settlement 
and, in its wake, the multi-culturalization of European societies (Bauböck 2002; Feldblum 1999; 
Leiken 2005).  However, in contrast to its earliest detractors, many of the contemporary critics of 
immigrant settlement are not inspired by overt racism, petty nationalism, or xenophobia.  Rather, 
their primary concern is that, as a consequence of mass immigrant settlement, European societies 
have become too diverse to sustain the mutual obligations that underpin a secure society and a 
generous welfare state; that is, mass immigration has created a precarious tradeoff between 
national social solidarity and ethnic and cultural diversity.  According to Goodhart (2004: 30), 
this tradeoff paradoxically presents an “acute dilemma for progressives who want plenty of both 
solidarity – high social cohesion and generous welfare paid out of a progressive tax system – and 
diversity – equal respect for a wide range of peoples, values and ways of life.”  
Finally, and most importantly for our purposes here, the elevation of immigration to the 
status of a “meta-issue” has destabilized the policy equilibrium that has hitherto prevailed across 
Western Europe.  Until the political earthquake of September 11
th, this equilibrium was founded 
upon the premise that each of the three dimensions of contemporary immigration policy – labor 
immigration policy, immigrant incorporation policy, and border control policy – could be 
formulated in relative isolation.  That is, decisions taken along one policy dimension of 
immigration did not much intersect nor circumscribe decisions made along other dimensions.  
Since September 11
th, the veracity of this premise has been undermined.  Specifically, the 
  4aforementioned and subsequent terrorist attacks have suggested to some that open economic 
borders and liberal immigrant incorporation policies, the twin pillars of Hollifield’s (1992) 
“embedded liberalism,” are now in conflict with the core responsibility of liberal states and 
governments to safeguard the physical safety of their citizens.   
  Indeed, as immigration-related issues have become more politically salient in a post-
September 11
th world, intra-European policy goals have become more conflicted, lurching toward 
the exclusion of immigrants in some contexts and their inclusion in other contexts.  On the one 
hand, the increasing proclivity of national governments in Europe to view immigration-related 
questions through the prism of physical safety has precipitated greater bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation to regulate the flow of persons, and especially asylum seekers and illegal migrants, 
across countries (Huysmans 2005; Levy 2005).  In particular, the inability of European states to 
stem unilaterally the flow of so-called “unwanted” immigration has facilitated the expansion of 
the policy making competence of the European Community, and especially the European 
Commission (Uçarer 2001) and the European Parliament (Lahav 1997; 2004a), over Europe’s 
territorial borders.  The overarching logic of inter-governmental cooperation and EU decision-
making on the control of borders is one of exclusion or closure (Hollifield, 1998: 597).                                                   
  On the other hand, other EU sponsored proposals and initiatives primarily have been 
inspired by the logic of inclusiveness or greater openness.  For example, in the face of 
demographic aging trends (European Commission 2005), a steep and unabated decline in the size 
of national labor forces (Schoenmaeckers et al. 2006), and abundant evidence of the insufficient 
and uneven incorporation of immigrants within European societies (Leiken 2005; Niessen et al. 
2005), both the European Parliament
3 and the European Commission have strongly advocated the 
                                                           
3 At a two-day hearing on March 14-15, 2005, MEPs from the Civil Liberties Committee and the 
Development Committee convened to discuss the EU’s immigration policy, especially focusing on the links 
between legal and illegal migration and the integration of migrants into society.  At the meeting they agreed 
that the EU must formulate a consistent policy to ease the path for third country nationals seeking to enter 
and work in the EU and to promote their becoming a full part of the community in which they settle.  In 
this way, the Committee concluded, illegal immigration could best be combated. 
  5adoption of common labor immigration policies and the expansion of the rights, including voting 
rights, of non-citizen immigrants, or third country nationals, across the member state countries.  
Moreover, prominent actors both within institutions have pushed hard for common policies that 
would facilitate greater legal immigration, including secondary immigration.   
  To complicate matters further, within a cooperative framework, as the immigration-
security linkage becomes more salient, it is possible that some nations are likely to seek more 
protectionist and go-it-alone policy strategies while others may prefer a multi-lateral framework 
(see Lahav, 2003).  Public opinion polls in November 2001 (exactly 2 months after September 
11
th) revealed that Europeans overwhelmingly delegate to EU authority in some form or other 
(either exclusively or with national authority), the fight against terrorism (EU average = 88%).
4  
Nonetheless, there were important variations among the EU countries, with countries such as the 
Netherlands, Denmark, France, Germany and Belgium more likely to delegate to the EU than the 
smaller, more recent members of thee EU, such as Austria, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, the 
UK and Finland.  Interestingly, these trends amidst the height of international terrorism suggest 
that the smaller, less economically developed and more EU peripheral countries prefer a “go-it-
alone” attitude in the face of heightened physical threat.
5  These variations compel us to consider 
the effects of the multi-dimensions of threat perceptions on prospects for EU communitarization. 
  
Propositions 
In light of the aforementioned policy tensions, this article raises and seeks empirical verification 
for three propositions.  First, in a post-September 11
th international security environment and after 
the influx of millions of new immigrants and asylees into the European Union over the past 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
4 This derives from a short flash survey by the European Commission, Eurobarometer 114 on 
“International Crisis” taken between 13-23 November 2001. 
5 These findings are not too surprising , given our prior understanding of differences between large and 
small (Feld and Wildgen, 1976), and between old and new members (Deheneffe, 1986: 28-33; Eichenberg 
and Dalton, 1993: 517-520; Niedermayer, 1995: 227-245).  What is surprising, however, is the substantial 
stability of this opinion given changing levels of international threat. 
  6decade (Table 2), contemporary MEPs will be more likely than in 1993 to view immigration as a 
salient public policy challenge.  If so and logically following from the first proposition, we 
anticipate a greater number of MEPs favoring a reduction in the level of new immigration; 
moreover, post-September 11th MEPs (inspired by the logic of exclusion) will view immigration 
as security threat along all three dimensions specified in Figure 1.  
(Table 2 about here) 
 Second, following the lead of their national governments,
6 and motivated to mitigate the 
“internal” security risks posed by the uneven or inadequate incorporation of settled immigrants 
(Leiken 2005), contemporary MEPs will be more likely than in the previous decade to favor the 
extension of economic, political and social rights to settled immigrants.  Inspired by the logic of 
inclusion, MEPs should be more willing than previously to support the extension of immigrant 
rights in order to improve “native”-immigrant social relations.   
Finally, given the contradictory agendas posed by contemporary immigration (i.e., 
immigrant exclusion vs. inclusion), we expect that a higher percentage of MEPs in 2004 than in 
1993 will prefer the responsibility for regulating immigration policy to reside at the EU rather 
than the national level; moreover, MEPs who are most inclined to view immigration as an 
“urgent” problem for physical security will prefer a European rather than a national decision 
making venue.  As social psychologists and political behaviorists have shown, increasing physical 
threat and issue salience promotes consensus and cooperation (Lahav 2004).  Specifically, we 
anticipate that “security conscious” MEPs will be more inclined than others to cooperate and to 
prefer to “escape to Europe” to address and resolve the contradictions and dilemmas posed by 
contemporary immigration (Geddes 2001; Guiraudon 2003).       
 
 
                                                           
6 As a general marker of the cross-national trend toward greater inclusiveness, immigrants are now 
permitted to hold dual citizenship in more than a half dozen of the major immigration-receiving countries 
(Niessen, Peiro and Schibel 2005: 35). 
  7Methodology and Profile of the Members of the European Parliament 
The data presented and described below derive from two surveys of the Members of the European 
Parliament administered at different points in time.  The first study, conducted in 1992-1993 
during the third assembly (1989-94), coincided with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), 
but before the EU had expanded to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden.  In this first survey, 
each of the then 518 MEPs was sent a close-ended questionnaire in English, French, or Italian.
7  
The 167 MEPs who responded to the survey (32 percent of the total) were broadly representative 
of the then 12 country parliamentary delegations and the 9 official party groupings, excluding the 
Independents in the European Parliament (Lahav, 2004a: 238).  The representativeness of the 
sample in terms of the distribution the larger MEP population by country is verified by a chi-
square test of association that is statistically significant at the .05 level.  In order to pursue the 
issues raised in the survey in greater depth, 54 MEPs were personally interviewed.    
  The second survey repeated many of the questions posed by the first but expanded upon 
the latter in an effort to account for the changes in the international security environment and on 
the immigration front that had occurred since the first questionnaire was executed a decade 
earlier.  In 2003-2004 each of the 625 MEPs
8 of the fifth assembly (1999-2004) were sent a 
written questionnaire in one of 5 languages: French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, or English.  In 
all, 148 MEPs responded, a sample representing 24 percent of the total group.  In addition to 
administering a written questionnaire, 15 MEPs were personally interviewed.  As in the earlier 
survey, the respondents were drawn from each of the member countries (15) and the then eight 
formal political party groups.  As in 1992-1993, the backgrounds of MEPs in our second sample 
fairly well reflected the proportional distribution of MEPs by country and party family within the 
                                                           
7 For a detailed description of the original study see Lahav 1995. 
 
8 With the inclusion of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, the number of MEPs increased to 626, but at the time 
of our survey one seat in the European Parliament was vacant. 
 
 
  8Parliament (Lahav and Messina 2005: 857).  However, since chi-square tests of the sample and 
population based on country and party family were not statistically significant, we are less sure 
that our 2004 sample is as representative as our 1993 sample.    
  Why privilege the study of MEP opinions?  We submit three reasons.  First, the opinions 
of MEPs and political elites are pertinent because they influence public political debate on a 
range of policy issues at both the national and European levels (Tsebelis, 1994).  In so doing, elite 
opinions circumscribe the parameters of policy choice (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981).  
Second, in stark contrast to their peripheral position prior to the mid 1980s, Members of the 
European Parliament are now significant policy making actors (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 
2000).  Most importantly, the European Parliament has acquired expansive decision-making 
competence on immigration and asylum-related issues since 2004.  And finally, the attitudes of 
the Members of the European Parliament are worth investigating because they likely reflect the 
full spectrum of elite views on immigration issues prevailing within the national context (Lahav 
2004a).  Indeed, for some countries, such as France, political elite opinion was far better 
represented within the 1999-2004 European Parliament than it was in the French National 
Assembly.
9   
The Evolution and Trajectory of MEP Opinion  
Increased Salience of Immigration? 
Based upon the evidence taken from our two surveys, there is little doubt that MEPs view 
immigration related issues as more salient in the current than in the previous decade.  As might 
have been reasonably anticipated in the light of the recent deterioration in the international and 
                                                           
9  On the basis of garnering 5.7% of the national vote for the 1999-2004 European Parliament the National 
Front, for example, had 5 MEPs in Brussels.  Conversely, although it received 11.3 % of the vote in the 
elections for the French National Assembly in 2002, the Front had not a single representative in the lower 
legislative house.   
 
  9regional security environment, fewer (10%) MEPs in 2004 than previously identified the issue of 
immigration as “not important” (Table 3).
10   
Table 3 about here 
As Table 3 also indicates, beneath the surface of change in aggregate elite opinion are 
important shifts in the distribution of MEP attitudes among the 12 original national delegations.  
Specifically, while the percentage of MEPs who identified the issue of immigration as not 
important remained relatively constant in Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal 
between 1993 and 2004, the percentage endorsing this perspective changed substantially (i.e. 
between 9 and 83 per cent) in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
United Kingdom.  With the exception of the Belgian respondents, every instance of substantial 
change involved a migration away from the view that immigration is an unimportant issue. 
 
Less Immigration? 
Given the aforementioned increase in the percentage of MEPs perceiving immigration as an 
important issue and the deterioration of the international security environment since 1993, we 
might also reasonably expect a higher percentage favoring a decrease in the overall level of 
immigration in 2004.  Somewhat surprisingly, this expectation did not materialize.  As Table 4 
illustrates, MEP opinion on the question of immigration levels changed relatively little from 1993 
to 2004, as the percentages of parliamentarians who favored one of three respective options – 
increasing immigration, keeping immigration at current levels and decreasing immigration – 
remained virtually constant over the period.  Having said this, the continuity in aggregate opinion 
masked decided shifts in national preferences.  Fewer MEPs in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy 
and Spain, for example, supported decreasing immigration between 1993 and 2004, while, on the 
other side of the coin, more Irish and British Members backed such limits.  In contrast, MEP 
                                                           
10These differences were statistically significant at the .05 level based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which 
was used as a non-parametric alternative to a t test. Seehttp:www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/notes2/analyze.htm. 
  10opinion remained virtually unchanged in France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Portugal.  Parliamentarians from Austria and Sweden, two of the three newest members of the 
EU’s third wave of expansion, ranked highest in preferring that the level of immigration be 
decreased (75 per cent and 50 per cent respectively). 
Table 4 about here 
 
Securitize Immigration? 
Given that MEPs view immigration-related issues as more salient in the current than in the 
previous decade, do contemporary Members see immigration equally as threatening along all 
three of the security dimensions specified in Figure 1 or, alternatively, do they discriminate 
among them?
11   
  As Table 5 demonstrates, with respect to the linkage of immigration problems with other 
issue areas, there is little doubt MEP opinion shifted somewhat in the interval between the first 
and second survey.  Although the linkages drawn between immigration problems and social 
welfare, unemployment, education and drug trafficking remained relatively constant between 
1993 and 2004, the connection of immigration to crime, citizenship and integration increased 
while race relations, unemployment and “other” issue areas decreased.   
Table 5 about here 
  Several results especially stand out with respect to the securitization of immigration.  
First, when offered a choice of nine possible responses, almost half of all MEPs cited one issue, 
immigrant “integration,” as the first area with which they linked immigration-related problems in 
2004.  Second and somewhat surprisingly given the inordinate attention it has attracted in the 
popular press, not a single MEP linked immigration with “drug trafficking” in either 1993 or 
2004.  Third, the connection MEPs drew between immigration and unemployment was 
                                                           
11Although our 1993 and 2004 surveys did not directly pose these questions, several questions that we 
posed did tap into MEP opinion on the securitization of immigration. 
  11conspicuously weak in 1993 (12%) and weaker still in 2004 (8%).  And finally, despite increasing 
from 1993, relatively few MEPs (7%) linked immigration with “crime” in 2004.  Taken as a 
whole, these results suggest that contemporary Members do discriminate among immigration-
related problems; that is, for most MEPs immigration problems have not posed and do not pose 
an equal threat along every security dimension.  Rather, problems related to “internal security” 
and, particularly those pertaining to  citizenship and social harmony, loom larger in the minds of 
MEPs than those posed by externally-driven security threats (i.e. drug trafficking) or internal 
economic problems (i.e. unemployment). 
  The data presented in Table 6 corroborate these conclusions.  As these data indicate, in 
contrast to the majority of their constituents who view immigrants as economically threatening 
(Ederveen et al. 2004: 82), most MEPs (56%) advocated greater economic immigration.  
Moreover, although a super majority of contemporary MEPs (74%) believes that extreme right 
groups are successfully exploiting immigration-related problems, three-quarters reject the 
argument that immigration poses a cultural threat.  At the very least, these findings suggest that 
most contemporary MEPs do not view immigration as a significant economic or cultural threat.
12
Table 6 about here 
  Having generally devalued immigration as an imposing cultural and economic threat, 
however, there is some evidence that the events of September 11
th have influenced MEP opinion 
and, specifically, heightened awareness of the implications of September 11
th for physical safety.  
As Table 6 demonstrates, more than half of MEPs (58%) agreed that a common European 
immigration policy is more “urgent” as a consequence of September 11th. 
 
Extend Immigrant Rights?  What of our proposition that, following the logic of inclusion, 
contemporary MEPs should be more inclined than in 1993 to favor expanding immigrant rights?  
                                                           
12 It is important however to note that the surveys were conducted 2 months prior to the Madrid 2004 
attacks, which along with the murder of Dutch writer Theo van Gogh  unleashed a spate of anti-Muslim 
attacks and public preoccupations with the cultural threats. 
  12As indicated in Table 7, this proposition generally was not validated by our survey results.  
Contrary to our expectations, MEP support for the extension of immigrant rights in general 
declined from 1993 to 2004, while both the percentage of those advocating maintaining the status 
quo and restricting immigrant rights increased.  Having said this, these findings require framing 
and, upon further consideration, may not be as negatively suggestive as they initially appear.  
First, despite declining from 1993, the percentage of MEPs who supported extending the rights of 
immigrants was still very high in 2004 (63%).  Second, and more important, the percentage of 
MEPs who preferred maintaining the status quo increased from 1993 to 2004, a shift that may be 
explained in part by the objective expansion of immigrant rights in the period between our two 
surveys (Niessen, Peiro and Schibel 2005).  If so, part the drop off in the percentage of MEPs 
supporting the extension of immigrant rights may have been driven by the perception that 
immigrant rights were already at historically high levels in 2004 and, thus, did not require further 
expansion.   
  Table 7 about here 
  Some support for the latter thesis is contained in Table 8, which records the preferences 
of MEPs with respect to extending the political, social and/or economic rights of immigrants.  
When the “rights” of immigrants were parsed into the aforementioned three categories in 2004,
13 
support among MEPs for extending immigrant rights declined and their endorsement of the status 
quo significantly rose from the general results (24%) in Table 8, with 43 percent of MEPs 
preferring the status quo on immigrant political rights, 30 percent on social rights, and 34 percent 
on economic rights, thus possibly suggesting that contemporary MEPs are especially satisfied 
with the post-1993 progress of the rights of immigrants.  Perhaps reflecting the negative their 
constituents’ negative sentiments on the issue (Lahav 2004a: 95-96), contemporary MEPs were 
most ambivalent about extending the political rights of immigrants.     
Table 8 about here 
                                                           
13 This question was not posed in 1993. 
  13 
Escape to Europe? 
Given the increased securitization of immigration in the period between our two surveys, are 
contemporary MEPs more likely than in 1993 to prefer a European rather than a national venue 
for regulating immigration policy?  Moreover, do MEPs who view immigration as an “urgent” 
problem for physical safety especially prefer a European venue to address and resolve 
immigration-related problems?  Are “physical safety” conscious MEPs especially inclined to 
“escape to Europe” to address and resolve the contradictions posed by immigration in a post-
September 11
th world? 
  As we reported with surprise elsewhere (Lahav and Messina 2005), contemporary MEPs 
are in fact less inclined than those in 1993 to look to Europe in order to resolve immigration-
related dilemmas (Table 9).  A sizeable minority (almost 40%) of MEPs in 2004 embraced the 
view that the responsibility for regulating immigration policy should exclusively reside in the 
hands of national governments.  More importantly, MEP support for this position rose by 12% 
over 1993, a change that was statistically significant at the .05 level as confirmed by rank-sum 
tests; furthermore, eight of 12 national delegations within the Parliament were more inclined to 
support this position in 2004 than previously.   
Table 9 about here 
  The shift in MEP opinion between 1993 and 2004 in favor of maintaining the 
prerogatives of national governments coincided with the erosion of MEP support for the position 
that responsibility for immigration policy should reside in the institutions of the European Union, 
subject to the potential of a national veto.  Whereas almost a third of MEPs in the aggregate 
endorsed the latter position in 1993, slightly greater than a fifth did so in 2004.  In contrast, 
support for the view that immigration should be regulated by the institutions of the EU on the 
basis of a majority vote was virtually identical in 2004 (41%) and 1993 (40%). 
  14Although MEPs are less inclined in this than in the previous decade to look to Europe to 
resolve immigration-related dilemmas, physical safety conscious MEPs, as we expected, are 
much more inclined than non-safety conscious Members to support an EU venue for regulating 
immigration policy.  As Table 10 demonstrates, MEPs who saw a common immigration policy as 
“urgent” as a consequence of September 11
th preferred a European to a member state decision-
making venue by approximately 2 to 1.  Conversely, among the Members who did not agree that 
a common immigration policy was urgent, most preferred that the member states bear the primary 
responsibility for regulating immigration policy.  Of course, these results may be skewed by the 
fact that embedded within our question about the urgency of a response to September 11
th was an 
explicit association with the need for a common immigration policy.  Yet, having said this, the 
possible ambiguousness of our question did not deter the 20 percent of MEPs who conceded a 
need for a common European immigration policy from preferring that such a policy be forged on 
an inter-governmental level, an especially surprising result given the EU’s ever expanding role in 
regulating immigration policy (Messina 2002). 
Table 10 about here 
 
Multidimensions of the Migration-Security Threat and Attitudes towards a Common EU 
Policy 
 
Since we are interested in how European policy-makers reconcile the various sources of threat 
related to migration, we focus in the next part of our analysis more closely on the implications for 
a comprehensive EU immigration policy.  Given that issue salience has grown among MEPs, as 
the previous section suggested, then it is possible that issue politicization has been mitigated in 
favor of more consensus and cooperation (Lahav 2004, 2007).  Thus, in addition to investigating 
whether and to what the degree to which MEP attitudes on immigration-related issues have 
changed over the period of 1993-2004, we are also interested in understanding  the factors that 
have influenced MEP attitudes on the proper approach and venue (i.e., national or supranational) 
  15for regulating immigration policy at a time when its salience is high, and at a single point in time 
when controlling for other, alternative explanations.  We give special attention to this question 
because of its implications for the emergence of a comprehensive common European immigration 
policy.   
In this section, we exclusively focus our analysis on the 2004 survey responses for two 
reasons.  First, it is the most recent of our two surveys and therefore the mostly likely to reflect 
current and near future MEP opinion.  Second, since it was distributed and collected after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 2001, the 2004 survey includes data pertaining to the physical 
safety dimension of the immigration-security nexus.  
 
Models and Analysis   
How do variables related to cultural, economic and physical security influence MEP preferences 
concerning which venue is best for regulating immigration policy?  In order to investigate these factors we 
rely upon ordered probit regression analysis to model categorical outcomes.   
Our first pair of models in Table 11 examines the influence of the variables pertaining to 
MEP concerns about cultural, economic and physical security to unilateral approaches to 
regulating immigration policy.  In Model 1, concerns about traditional culture had a positive 
effect on unilateral approaches to immigration policy that was highly statistically significant.  As 
we anticipated, as an MEP/s view of immigration as undermining his/her countrty’s traditional 
culture increases, he/she is more likely to support unilateral approaches to regulating immigration 
policy.  However, neither of the other security oriented study variables was statistically 
significant.   
Our second model introduces an array of theoretically relevant control variables (i.e., 
ideology) so we can better identify whether concerns that immigrants undermine traditional 
culture alone has as strong an effect on unilateral approaches when controlling for other rival 
  16explanations.  Ultimately, we find that in the presence of control variables, the statistically 
significant effect of concerns about traditional culture evaporates.     
(Table 11 about here) 
As for the control variables, perceptions of state ineffectiveness in dealing with refugees 
has a negative and statistically significant (p<.005) effect on unilateral approaches to regulating 
immigration.  This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that the perception that problems of 
asylum-seekers and refugees are so difficult that they can’t be effectively or exclusively dealt 
with on a national level would negatively effect support for unilateral approaches and promote 
support for a common immigration policy.  We also find support for the hypothesis that the 
perception that extreme right groups are expoliting immigration-related problems lead to more 
support for a common immigration policy.  Indeed, the variable for perceived right-wing 
exploitation has a negative effect on unilateral approaches.  We believe this suggests that MEPs 
who fear right-wing exploitation of immigration domestically wish to “escape to Europe.”  We 
are drawn to two possible explanations for such behavior.  First, MEPs who fear domestic, right-
wing actors may be afraid that their adversaries will successfully manipulate the symbol of 
September 11
th to thwart favorable immigration policies.  A second explanation is that MEPs may 
fear the political fallout from having immigration policy crafted within their respective states 
where right-wing players could politically exploit immigration-related debates.  Of course, these 
explanations — the first being policy oriented and the second being politically motivated — are 
not mutually exclusive.                                
In Table 12 we use two models to estimate the effects of several variables on MEPs’ 
personal support for a common immigration policy.  In Model 1, we find that concerns about the 
threat immigration poses for a country’s traditional culture and the benefits of EU law 
enforcement cooperation have highly significant coefficients with respect to MEP support for a 
common immigration policy.  However, these relationships do not persist in the presence of the 
control variables.  It is important, nonetheless, to take note of the performance of the variable for 
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the predicted positive sign and achieves high levels of statistical significance consistent with our 
hypothesis about the ineffective role of state institutions to deal with asylum-seekers and refugee 
policy. 
Table 12 about here 
The results for the models of urgency for a common immigration policy following 
September 11th are represented in Table 13.  Unlike the two previous models, the variable for 
effective EU police cooperation has a positive, statistically significant coefficient that is robust 
across both the small and expanded models.  Another study variable that was statistically 
significant was concern about traditional culture.  This finding raises two possibilities.  First, 
MEPs who are concerned about the effect of immigration on traditional culture may recognize 
that their fears are best addressed by a common immigration policy post-September 11th.  Of 
course, this begs the question why traditional culture did not also display a similar relationship in 
Model 2 from Table 10 when the outcome was MEP support for common immigration policy?  
We suspect that the difference in the performance of traditional culture in Model 2 of Table 11 
(but not in Model 2 of Table 10) results from an urgency born of political opportunism.  We 
contend that MEPs concerned about protecting traditional culture see the events of September 
11
th as creating a favorable opportunity for opposing a common immigration policy.       
Tables 13 about here 
A similar process may also be working in the opposite direction with respect to one of the 
control variables in the second model of Table 11.  In that model we find that concerns about the 
exploitation of immigration by right-wing groups have a positive and highly significant 
association with expressions of an urgent need for a common immigration policy after September 
11
th.  This result dovetails nicely with and supports our supposition that MEPs who most 
earnestly identify right-wing exploitation of immigration problems want immigration policy 
crafted outside of the national arena for either considerations related to policy, politics or a 
  18combination of the two motives.  This is not altogether surprising as many MEPs may fear that 
the events of September 11
th could open a window of opportunity for domestic right-wing actors 
to thwart desirable immigration policies.  
  In all cases, these preoccupations may presciently explain why EU policy-making related 
to migration and security assumed a more serious upsurge in the post-2004 period than following 
September 11, 2001 (Lahav 2007).  The murder of Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh by an 
Islamic extremist on 2 November 2004, was shocking to those who considered that his murderer 
was actually born and raised in the Netherlands (despite holding dual Dutch and Moroccan 
nationality). The Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004 and the July 7, 2005 bombings of the 
London Underground indeed fostered the perception that Islam was a threat to the European 
social and political system.  In all cases, the findings reinforce developments in the post-2004 
period.  They suggest that the interaction effects of cultural insecurity with physical threat may 
promote a consensus based on restrictivism (Lahav, 2004).  That is, such cooperation may 
represent the reconciliation of the immigration counter-pressures. 
 
Conclusions 
It was reasonable to presume, as we did in our original propositions, that in a post-September 
11th “new security” world, immigration-related issues would become more politically salient and 
be perceived as such by Members of the European Parliament.  Moreover, its increased political 
salience would motivate contemporary MEPs to be less disposed than previously to support new 
immigration and influence most Members to view it as a potent threat along all three dimensions 
(culture, economy, and physical) of the new immigration-security nexus.  Moreover, in order to 
mitigate the “internal” security risks spawned by the uneven incorporation of settled immigrants, 
MEPs would be more inclined in 2004 than in the previous decade to favor extending their 
economic, political and social rights.  Finally, given the conflicting agendas posed by 
contemporary immigration (i.e., immigrant exclusion vs. inclusion), we could reasonably expect a 
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immigration policy reside at the EU rather than the national level; moreover, the MEPs most 
inclined to view immigration as an “urgent” problem for physical security would prefer a 
European over a domestic decision making venue.   
  In fact, our data yielded mixed results with regard to these propositions.  On the one 
hand, a super majority (85%) of contemporary MEPs did conclude that immigration was “very 
important” and the percentage who viewed it as “not important” was significantly smaller in 1993 
than in 2004 (Table 3).  On the other hand, and contrary to our expectations, a majority of MEPs 
in 2004 wanted immigration to remain at its current levels, a majority that actually increased from 
1993 (Table 4). 
  Equally surprising in the aftermath of September 11
th, and seemingly at odds with the 
preferences of most of their constituents, is the extent to which MEPs in 2004 favored increasing 
economic immigration and the very high percentage of Members who rejected the suggestion that 
immigration poses a cultural threat (Table 6).  Although a robust majority agreed that a European 
immigration policy is more urgent after September 11
th, it is fair to conclude on the basis of the 
totality of the data that MEPs in 2004, as in 1993, were not especially inclined to view 
immigration through the prism of national or European security.  This conclusion must be 
tempered, of course, by the results reported in Table 5 which indicate that a high percentage of 
contemporary MEPs were concerned about the current state both of immigrant incorporation (i.e., 
integration and citizenship) and native-immigrant social relations (i.e., race relations).  
Nevertheless, as we remarked above, their concern about drug trafficking and crime, the signature 
issues of domestic political far right groups and political parties (Mudde 2000:173-174; 
Veugelers 2000), was conspicuously weak both in 1993 and 2004.  Minimally, the data suggest 
that contemporary Members differentiate among immigration-related problems and that, for most 
MEPs, immigration problems do not pose an equal threat along every security dimension.  At the 
very least several problems related to “internal security,” and particularly those pertaining to 
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driven security threats (i.e., drug trafficking) or internal economic problems (i.e. unemployment). 
  Also contrary to our expectations, MEP support for the extension of immigrant rights 
generally declined from 1993 to 2004, while both the percentage of those advocating maintaining 
the status quo and restricting immigrant rights increased.  Moreover, when the rights of 
immigrants were parsed into three core categories (economic, political and social) in 2004 (Table 
6), MEP support for extending immigrant rights further declined from the general results (Table 
5).  Contemporary MEPs were especially ambivalent about extending the political rights of 
immigrants. 
  Perhaps most surprising is that MEPs were less inclined in 2004 than in 1993 to look to 
Europe in order to resolve immigration-related dilemmas (Table 9).  Almost 40% of MEPs in 
2004 embraced the view that the responsibility for regulating immigration policy should 
exclusively reside in the hands of national governments.  Although Members were less inclined to 
look to Europe to resolve immigration-related dilemmas, however, physical security conscious 
MEPs, as we had anticipated, were much more inclined than non security oriented Members to 
support an EU venue for regulating immigration policy, with those seeing a common immigration 
policy as “urgent” in the aftermath of September 11
th preferring a European to a member state 
decision-making venue by a wide margin (approximately 2 to 1).  
  What can we conclude from these mixed and sometimes counterintuitive results?  One 
unimpeachable conclusion is that the general public’s alleged conflation of the cultural, 
economic, and physical threats to domestic and European security (Tsoukala 2005), a proposition 
put forward in much recent scholarship (Faist 2002; Huysmans 2000a), is not mirrored in the 
collective thinking of contemporary Members of the European Parliament.  To the contrary, most 
Members differentiate one dimension of immigration from the next and, perhaps more 
importantly, they have successfully transcended the atmospheric political pressures to restrict all 
new immigration, and especially economic immigration (Table 6).  Put somewhat differently, the 
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th do not seem to have precipitated a “fortress Europe” mindset among 
most MEPs (Geddes 2000).  Nor have Members become especially xenophobic (Table 6). 
  Having said this, to the extent that the European public may be looking to the Parliament 
and/or other Community institutions to resolve the contradictions raised by contemporary 
immigration flows, of whatever type (Messina 2002: 106-110), it is likely to be disappointed.  
This is so for at least two reasons.  First, as we reported elsewhere (Lahav and Messina 2005: 
869-870) MEP attitudes do not appear any more convergent in 2004 (post-September 11
th) than in 
1993 (pre- September 11
th).  Indeed, with regard to the subject of immigration restrictions, 
Member attitudes are fairly polarized, with approximately one-quarter of MEPs in favor of 
increasing restrictions, one-quarter against, and approximately half in favor of maintaining the 
status quo.  Similarly, while obviously cognizant of the problems associated with immigrant 
incorporation (Table 5) and generally supportive of extending immigrant rights (Table 7), MEPs  
in fact are much more divided on the question of whether the political, social and/or economic 
rights of immigrants should be extended (Table 8).  On each of these core rights a sizeable 
percentage of MEPs (52, 42, and 42 percent respectively) preferred either the policy status quo or 
restrictions, thus leading to the obvious conclusion that there is no consensus among Members to 
move forward in this policy area.   
  Second, the results in Table 9 make evident that there is similarly no consensus within the 
Parliament on the preferred venue for regulating immigration policy.  Indeed, on the question of 
where the primary responsibility for regulating immigration policy should lie, MEP attitudes were 
generously distributed among three very different and conflicting poles.  Perhaps more 
importantly because of its negative implications for forging and sustaining a coherent a truly 
European immigration policy, 60 percent of MEPs in 2004 supported the proposition that 
immigration should be regulated either by national governments or by the EU, subject to the 
retention of an individual member state veto.  In short, even in the wake (or perhaps because?) of 
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th, most Members preferred to defend their country’s traditional 
prerogative to regulate immigration policy.       
  While there is no current consensus among MEPs on the best venue for immigration 
policymaking, our regression results do, however, tentatively suggest how variation in other 
underlying factors could alter support for unilateral approaches to immigration or support for a 
common immigration policy more broadly.  If perceptions of state ineffectiveness spread among 
MEPs, it could erode support for unilateral regulatory approaches and increase support for a 
common immigration policy.  Also, if another calamity on the magnitude of 9/11 occurs in the 
future, it could create a political opportunity in which the outcome regarding immigration policy 
would be influenced by not only the sense that European law enforcement cooperation has been 
effective, but also by the political power of MEPs who fear either the erosion of traditional 
culture or right-wing exploitation of the event.   
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Table 1.  Perceived Threat from Ethnic Minorities in 19 EU Member Countries, 2004 
 
 
 
Note: Figures represent the averages of multiple questions put to respondents about the economic and 
cultural threat posed by immigrants.  They included questions about whether or not immigrants “steal 
jobs,” “cost more money than they contribute,” “are bad for the economy,” “undermine the culture,” and 
“make the country a worse place to live.”   
 
Source: Ederveen et al. 2004: 82. 
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Country  Total Pop 
 (thousands) 
Number of 
Foreign 
Population 
(thousands) 
% of  
Foreigners/ 
Total Pop 
(1995-98) 
Total 
Population 
(2000-2)e 
Total no 
foreign 
population
thousands
)
e
% of 
foreigners
Total Pop 
(2000) 
% change 
            
Austria 
Belgium      
Denmark 
Finland 
France
 b
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy
a
Luxembourg
c 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
8,040 
10,143 
5,251 
5,117 
56,577 
81,817 
10,465 
3626 
54,780 
419 
15,494 
9,921 
39,742 
8,837 
56,652 
728.2 
910 
223 
69 
3597
 
7173 
155 
117 
1095.6
 
142.8 
726
 
169 
499 
531 
1992 
9.0 
9.0 
4.3 
1.4 
6.4
 
8.8 
1.5 
3.2 
2.0
 
34.1 
4.7
 
1.7 
1.3 
6.0 
3.4 
8.080 
10,249 
  5,320 
  5,172 
59,238 
 82,017 
10,610 
  3,803 
 57,530 
 437 
 15,864 
 10,016 
39,910 
8,842 
59,415 
 756 
 879 
 304 
  134 
6,277 
7,349 
   534 
  310 
 1634 
   162 
  1,576 
  233 
  1,259 
   993 
4,029 
9.4 
8.6 
5.7 
 2.6 
10.6 
 9.0 
 5.0 
 8.1 
2.8 
37.2 
9.9 
2.3 
3.2 
11.2 
 6.8 
    4.4% 
   -4.4% 
   32.6% 
   85.7% 
   65.6% 
    2.3% 
   233% 
   153% 
    40% 
      9% 
   111% 
   35.3% 
   69.2% 
   86.7% 
   100% 
            
Source:  LAHAV 2007, EUROSTAT 1999 (reporting on 1997 figures, unless noted otherwise;  SOPEMI, 
OECD, 1992, 1999;  UN Population Division, 2002 
*Note:  OECD and Eurostat data are derived from population registers of foreigners, except for France (census), Portugal and Spain 
(residence permits), Ireland and the United Kingdom (Labour Force Survey).  Figures do not equal total due to the differences in 
reports. 
a OECD 1999 (reporting 1996 figures) 
b OECD 1992 (reporting 1990 figures) 
c EUROSTAT 1999 (reporting 1996) 
dEUROSTAT 1994 (reporting 1992 figures)  
e UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migration 2002 
(reporting 2000 figures) 
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Country  Not Important  Neutral  Very Important  Net Change in  
Not Important 
  1993  2004  1993  2004  1993    2004  1993- 2004 
Austria  --  0 --  0 -- 100  --- 
Belgium  0 17  20  0  80  83    +17 
Denmark  0 0  25  14  75  88    0 
Finland  --  50 --  50 --  0  --- 
France  4 0  9  19  87  81    –4 
Germany  9 0  5  13  86  83    –9 
Greece  13  0 50  0 38 100    –13 
Ireland  83 0 0  0  17  100    –83 
Italy  4  0 12  7 84 95    –4 
Luxembourg  0 0  0  0  100  100  0 
Netherlands  14 0 0  0  86  100    –14 
Portugal  14  17 29  17 57  67    +3 
Spain  26 6  21  12  53  82    –20 
Sweden  -- 0  --  25  --  75  --- 
U. K.  12 0  36  13  52  88    –12 
Total  13 3  17  12  70  85    -10 
 
N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004).  
 
Responses to the question: “How important do you think the immigration issue is to you?”     
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Country  Increased  Kept at Present 
Level 
Decreased  Net Change in 
Decreased 
  1993  2004 1993  2004  1993 2004  1993-2004 
Austria  -- 25 -- 0 -- 75  -- 
Belgium 11  25  56  75 33  0  -33 
Denmark  0 25 33  63  67 13  -54 
Finland -- 50  -- 50 --  0  -- 
France  16 15 47  54  37 31  -6 
Germany  41 17 26  50  35 32  -2 
Greece  43 25 14  50  43 25  -18 
Ireland 0  0  83  67  17 33  +17 
Italy  32 40 45  47  23 13  -10 
Luxembourg 0  0  100  100  0  0  0 
Netherlands 16  0  62  80  23  20  -3 
Portugal 17  0  83 100 0  0  0 
Spain 44  46 44  54  11  0  -11 
Sweden  -- 50 -- 0 -- 50  -- 
U. K.  15  7  75  57  10  36  +26 
Total 
 
25 
 
23 
 
51 
 
56 
 
24 
 
21 
 
-3 
 
N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004).                                                                                                               
 
Responses to the question: “Should immigration in general be kept at its present level, increased, or 
decreased?” 
 
 
Table 5.  Immigration Problems and their Linkage with Other Policy Areas, 1993-2004 
(in percent) 
 
 
Issue Linkages 
 
 
1993 
 
2004 
Integration 35  47 
Citizenship 4  12 
Race Relations  25  10 
Social Welfare  7  8 
Unemployment 12  8 
Other 15  8 
Crime 1  7 
Education 1  1 
Drug trafficking  0  0 
 
N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004). 
 
Responses to the question: “When you think of immigration problems, to which other area do you relate 
them first?” 
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Table 6.  Securitization of Immigration, 2004 (in percent) 
 
 
Opinion Statements 
 
 
Agree
 
Disagree 
 
No Opinion
Immigration is a Cultural Threat  19  75  5 
Economic Immigration Should be Increased  56  29  15 
Extreme Right is Exploiting Immigration-Related Problems 74  23  3 
European Immigration Policy Urgent after September 11th  58  30  12 
N = 148. 
Responses to the statements:  
“Immigrants and asylum seekers undermine my country’s traditional culture.” 
“Legal, economic immigration to my country should be increased.” 
“Extreme political right groups in my country are successfully exploiting immigration-related problems.” 
“The events of September 11, 2001 have made the pursuit of a common European immigration policy more 
urgent.”  
 
 
Table 7.  Support for Immigrant Rights, 1993-2004 (in percent) 
 
Preference   1993  2004 
Extended 77  63 
Status Quo  19  24 
Restricted 4  13 
 
N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004). 
 
Responses to the question: “What should be done about the rights of immigrants?” 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Support for Immigrant Rights, 2004 (in percent) 
 
Preference   Political Social  Economic 
Extended 48  58  58 
Status Quo  43  30  34 
Restricted 9  12  8 
 
N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004). 
 
Responses to the question: “Should the following rights for immigrants be extended, left as they are, or 
restricted?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  28Table 9.  Preferred Venue for Regulating Immigration Policy, 1993-2004 (in percent) 
 
 
Country 
 
National 
Governments 
 
 
EU, with 
Member State 
Veto Option 
 
 
EU Institutions, 
on the Basis of 
Majority Vote 
 
Net Change 
toward National 
Governments  
          1993       2004           1993     2004          1993      2004            1993-2004 
Austria             --           25         --             0            --           55                    -- 
Belgium            10           33        20             0           70           67                  +23 
Denmark            25           75        50           13           25           13                  +50 
Finland            --            50         --             0            --           50                    -- 
France            29           45        33           30            38          25                  +16 
Germany            43           41        24             9            33          29                    -2 
Greece            13           25        50           25            38          50                  +13 
Ireland              0           33        50             0            50          67                  +33 
Italy            20           21        16           21            64          58                   +1 
Luxembourg            33           33        67           67              0            0                    0 
Netherlands            31           20        31           40            38          40                 -11 
Portugal            29           67        57             0            14          33                 +38 
Spain            16             6        48           19            37          75                  -10 
Sweden            --            25         --           50            --           25                   -- 
United Kingdom            46           64        21           18            33          18                  +18 
 
Total 
 
 
          27           39 
    
       32           21 
 
 
          41           40 
 
                +12 
N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004). 
Responses to the question: “Who should be responsible for regulating immigration policy: 1) national 
governments acting independently; 2) national governments, through prior consultation with other EU 
governments; 3) EU institutions, with member governments retaining the right of veto; 4) EU institutions, 
through majority vote.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  29Table 10.  Post-9/11 Security Consciousness and Preferred Venue for Regulating 
Immigration Policy, 2004 (in percent) 
 
Venue for Regulating Immigration 
Policy 
   
 
EU 
 
Member States 
 
Total 
Agree 
 
39 
 
20 
 
59 
Disagree  13 17  30 
 
Common Policy 
Urgent Post-Sept. 
11
th
No Opinion  9 2  11 
 Total  61  39  100 
N = 148 
Responses to the questions: 
“The events of September 11, 2001 have made the pursuit of a common European immigration policy more 
urgent.” 
“Who should be responsible for regulating immigration policy: 1) national governments acting 
independently; 2) national governments, through prior consultation with other EU governments; 3) EU 
institutions, with member governments retaining the right of veto; 4) EU institutions, through majority 
vote?”  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11:  Models of MEP preferences for a Unilateral Approach to Regulating 
Immigration 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
    
Traditional Culture  .373***  .073 
Support for Economic Immigration  -.165  -.334 
Police cooperation  -.175  .190 
Conservative Ideology    .126 
Public Support    -.290 
Support Faster Integration    -.455 
State Ineffective w/ refugees    -.657*** 
Right-wing Exploitation    -.301* 
Support > Immigrant Rights    -.446 
Support < Muslim Immigration    -.150 
    
N 110  76 
Log Likelihood  -127.84  -62.44 
 
p < .05*  p <  .01**   p < .005*** 
 
 
 
 
 
  30Table 12:  Models of MEP Support for a Common Immigration Policy 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
    
Traditional Culture  -.542***  -.024 
Support for Economic Immigration  -.109  -.052 
Police cooperation  .601***  .348 
Conservative Ideology    -.101 
Public Support    -.165 
Support Faster Integration    .529 
State Ineffective w/ refugees    .577*** 
Right-wing Exploitation    .116 
Support > Immigrant Rights    .318 
Support < Muslim Immigration    -.157 
    
N 111  77 
Log Likelihood  -88.94  -51.62 
 
p < .05*  p <  .01**   p < .005*** 
 
 
 
Table 13:  Models of MEP Urgency for Common Immigration Policy Post-September 11th 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
    
Traditional Culture  -.221  -.449* 
Support for Economic Immigration  -.146  -.127 
Police cooperation  .563***  .573** 
Conservative Ideology    .117 
Public Support    -.084 
Support Faster Integration    -.096 
State Ineffective w/ refugees    .296 
Right-wing Exploitation    .458*** 
Support > Immigrant Rights    -.275 
Support < Muslim Immigration    .228 
    
N 101  70 
Log Likelihood  -127.87  -81.29 
 
 
p < .05*  p <  .01**   p < .005*** 
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APPENDIX: Variables 
Dependent Variables
14  
 
Regulating Immigration Policy:   National or supranational venue for regulating 
immigration policy?  Those MEPs in our 2004 survey who indicated that the responsibility for 
regulating immigration policy should reside with national governments acting independently or 
through prior consultation with other EU member state governments were coded as 4 and 3 
respectively.  Alternatively, those who indicated that regulatory responsibility should reside with 
EU institutions, either with member governments retaining a right of veto or through a majority 
vote, were coded as 2 and 1 respectively.     
 
Support for a Common Immigration Policy?  Variable measuring the degree to which MEPs 
agreed that there should be a common immigration policy.  The responses were coded 4 for 
strongly agree, 3 for agree, 2 for disagree and 1 for strongly disagree.   
 
Common Immigration Policy Urgent post-September 11
th:  While the attacks of September 
11
th, 2001 in the United States were obviously disconcerting to European political elites, the fact 
that they were executed by Muslim and Arab men must have been especially troubling for those 
MEPs whose countries are home to many persons of a similar background.  Thus, we are curious 
about which factors may have contributed to inspiring a sense of urgency among MEPs for 
forging a common European immigration policy.  This variable measured the degree to which 
MEPs acknowledged that a common immigration policy is urgent in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th.  This four part categorical variable is coded as 4 for strongly agree, 3 
for somewhat agree, 2 for somewhat disagree and 1 for strongly disagree.     
 
 
Independent Variable:  
Each of the following main independent variables represents a different dimension of the 
immigration-security nexus.      
 
Threat to Traditional Culture:  This variable measures the degree to which MEPs perceive 
immigrants and asylum seekers as undermining their respective country’s traditional culture, with 
values ranging from 4 to 1 for responses ranging from strongly agree and somewhat agree to 
somewhat disagree and strongly disagree.     
 
Support for Increased Economic Immigration:  This variable allows us to get a sense of how 
MEP attitudes on economic security influence the outcomes. This variable was operationalized in 
four categories with respect to whether or not MEPs thought legal, economic immigration to their 
country should be increased.  Responses were located on a four point scale with the highest score 
assigned for “strong agreement” followed by modest agreement, modest disagreement and strong 
disagreement, respectively. 
 
Value of Police Cooperation:   This variable pertains to the perceived benefits of police 
cooperation within the EU to reduce crime.  Of all our variables, this one best approximates the 
European Union’s capacity to safeguard physical security.   
                                                           
14 In addition to being interested in these dependent variables, in several models they are also used 
as independent variables as indicated below.    
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Control Variables 
 
Ideology:  This variable has 9 levels on an ideological spectrum ranging from conservative (9) to 
liberal (1) reflecting Members’ ideological self-placement.        
 
Perceived Public Support for a Common Immigration Policy:  This trichotomous variable 
was coded from 3 to 1 representing responses that were respectively favorable, indifferent and 
unfavorable.     
 
Support for Speeding up European Integration:  This categorical variable was coded as 
having three levels.  MEPs preferring accelerated European integration were coded as 3, those 
supporting the present rate of integration were coded as 2, and finally, those wanting to slow the 
progress of integration were coded as 1.    
 
State Ineffectiveness at Dealing with Refugees and Asylum Seekers:  MEP’s attitude toward 
his/her country’s ability to address issues related to refugees and asylum seekers effectively.  
This variable ranges from 1 to 4, with 4 representing the value of the greatest skepticism of 
national government effectiveness (based on the response “strongly agree”) to 1 for the least 
skepticism (for the response “strongly disagree”).       
 
Perceived Extreme Right Wing Group Exploitation:  The degree to which MEPs perceived 
immigration-related problems are being successfully exploited for political gain by domestic 
extreme right groups.  We coded their responses from 4 to 1 in accordance with whether an MEP 
agreed strongly, agreed only somewhat, somewhat disagreed and strongly disagreed.      
 
Support for Immigrant Rights:  This trichotomous categorical variable assumes a value of 3 for 
MEPs supporting an extension of immigrant rights, 2 for those backing the status, quo and 1 for 
those who want immigrant rights to be restricted.   
 
Support Decreased Muslim Immigration:  We include this variable to control for how MEP 
opposition to Muslim or Arab immigration influences overall attitudes.  To operationalize this 
dummy variable we pooled responses indicating that MEPs wanted decreased immigration from 
the Middle East, North Africa or Turkey.  Such responses were coded as 1, while responses 
favoring present levels or increased immigration from these areas were assigned a 0.  While we 
realize that non-Arabs and non-Muslims also emigrate from these areas, we reasonably assume 
that most immigrants from these areas are either Muslim or Arab.      
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